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Near-miss reports are qualitative descriptions of events that could have harmed patients but did not due
to a timely intervention or a convenient evolution of the circumstances. Near-miss reporting has increas-
ingly become a relevant tool to support patient safety efforts since they provide some evidence of risk in
the system before patients suffer adverse consequences. Near-misses are usually classiﬁed into pre-spec-
iﬁed categories that correspond to sources of risk in the system or its processes. Their analysis often con-
sists of tallying classiﬁed near-misses to determine risk priorities based on frequency within each pre-
speciﬁed risk category. Our research aims to use different combinations of near-miss reports to ﬁnd
potential sources of risk. We propose an unsupervised bisecting k-prototypes algorithm for clustering
coded near-miss reports to identify relationships between events that would not otherwise have been
easily identiﬁed. Subsequent study of resulting clusters will lead to the identiﬁcation of potentially dan-
gerous, but unsuspected system interactions. We illustrate or methodology with preliminary results of its
implementation at the University of South Florida Health clinics.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
According to the HealthGrades Seventh Annual Patient Safety in
American Hospitals Study, one million patient-safety incidents oc-
curred from 2006 to 2008 among Medicare patients. One in ten pa-
tients that experienced a patient-safety incident subsequently
died. Costs related were estimated to be $8.9 billion [1]. The report
notes that according to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement,
there are 40,000 harm-related events daily [2].
Most hospitals have some mechanism for reporting incidents to
identify related risks and prevent their reoccurrence. Incident
reports mostly consist of free text or narrative. These reports are
analyzed by being classiﬁed into a pre-speciﬁed classiﬁcation sys-
tem that allows tabulating and aggregating events according to the
predeﬁned attributes. This type of analysis leads to prioritization of
safety initiatives, and allocation of interventions to sources of risk
related to the most frequent attributes. Classifying is a limited
approach since some of the most devastating accidents have been
the result of risks identiﬁed only in hindsight. Attributes that char-
acterize different components of an incident generally point to
well-known (potential) risk areas, so analysts can identify only
obvious relations among incidents.ll rights reserved.
josezaya@usf.edu (J. Zayas-The Institute of Medicine strongly encourages reporting and
analysis of near-misses since they can point out risk without
patients being harmed. Near-misses are incidents that could have
caused harm but did not [3]. They are believed to be indicators
of areas of increased risk. They are also much more frequent than
adverse events, offering advantages for risk identiﬁcation and anal-
ysis [4].
This research is focused on developing a methodology to sup-
port the gathering and analysis of near-miss reports. It proposes
a taxonomy to code near-misses and an unsupervised clustering
methodology to process such reports and guide further risk analy-
sis. The outcome of this methodology is a rank of groups of reports
that may lead to the identiﬁcation of obvious, as well as potentially
hidden, sources of risk. The proposed methodology is applicable to
different (preferred) classiﬁcation systems and can be automated
into a risk management information system.
The next section introduces concepts related to near-misses and
their analysis, including existing taxonomies for their classiﬁca-
tion. Section 3 introduces the proposed methodology to analyze
near-miss reports and the proposed taxonomy for near-misses.
Section 4 explains clustering of near-miss reports. Section 5 pre-
sents suggestions for risk analysis using near-miss clusters and
illustrates the output of the clustering methodology using simu-
lated data. Section 6 presents some comments on the validity of
our approach, and conclusions and future work are discussed in
Section 7.
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‘‘Near-miss’’ is a term borrowed from aviation that denotes an
adverse event that did not occur because of the intervention of
an individual or by a fortunate evolution of the circumstances. It
refers to incidents that did not result in harm. They are believed
to be precursors of adverse events [6] and thus share the same cau-
sal continuum [7] as documented in chemical [8] and transporta-
tion safety research [4,9]. They allow for analysis of risks before
consequences are observed and are more frequent than adverse
events (7–100 times more frequent [4]).
The use of near-miss reports has disadvantages typical of inci-
dent reporting systems [10–14]. Therefore, it requires a reporting
infrastructure that is simple (non-disruptive), conﬁdential and
non-punitive. The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005 (Public Law 109-41), was enacted to address reporting barri-
ers [13]. Still, incident reports constitute a non-random sample of
an unknown population at risk; therefore, simple rates of reported
incidents are not proper metrics to monitor safety. There is a need
for the development of more suitable methods to analyze incident
reports [17].
2.1. Incident reporting and analysis
Incident reporting is relevant to health care delivery because
risks related to human behavior are intangible. In such situations,
systematic reporting and analysis helps to identify weaknesses in
the system before accidents occur. However, expertise and thor-
ough analysis are required to identify system risk [6] .
Most incident reporting systems consist of free text. Therefore,
their analysis is generally done by experts who review, classify and
codeeachreportaccordingtoataxonomythatallowsforcontext-spe-
ciﬁcinterpretation[13,19,20].Analysisofaggregateclassiﬁedreports
helps determine areas that require deeper investigation [21] and
establish priorities. Some authors have proposed enriching incident
reportsbylinkingthemtoelectronicmedicalrecordssotheanalysisin-
cludes patient risk factors [22,23]. Incident reports are also analyzed
individually to identify root causes, similar to the Aviation Safety
ReportingSystem[15]. In the caseofnear-misses, root causeanalysis
(RCA) is believed to lead to the identiﬁcation of potential adverse
eventsandtheircauses[24,25],althoughtheirgeneralizationrequires
consistency of risk throughout the different processes within and
aroundthedelivery system[26].
Health care is attempting to replicate the incident reporting and
analysis model of aviation. The US Aviation Safety Reporting Sys-
tem consists of teams of trained coders who analyze each reported
incident. Unfortunately, estimates suggest that around one million
serious errors occur each year in healthcare delivery systems [27],
which signiﬁcantly exceeds the frequency of incidents in aviation
and makes the development and implementation of a national
reporting/analysis system costly and logistically difﬁcult to imple-
ment [17]. Nevertheless, near-miss reporting has been introduced
in some patient safety programs in hospitals [28,33]. Still, imple-
mentation has been rather slow because of reporting barriers and
limited analyses [29–32].
2.2. Incident classiﬁcation systems
An effective classiﬁcation is needed to systematically detect and
analyze patient safety events. Classiﬁcation systems for errors and
near-misses can be found addressing speciﬁc areas of health care
[34]. Most taxonomies deal with hospital based incidents, but
there are a number of studies that propose classiﬁcation systems
for primary care [35].The following is a summary of classiﬁcation systems found in
the literature. The National Coordinating Council for Medication
Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP) published a taxonomy
of medication errors in 1998 [34]. Wilson et. al. [36] developed a
generic taxonomy in 1999, from an analysis of the adverse events
presented in a study of the quality of Australian health care pub-
lished in 1995. Dovey et al. [37] proposed a preliminary taxonomy
for error in family medicine in 2002. Rubin et al. presented their
classiﬁcation of errors in health care in 2003 [38] which was used
in 2006 by Steele [39] in primary optometric care with satisfying
results. In 2004, Zhang et al. [40] proposed and evaluated a cogni-
tive taxonomy of medical errors to understand and potentially pre-
dict them. In 2005, Woods et al. [41] presented a system to classify
patient safety events. In 2002, Makeham et al. described the inter-
national taxonomy developed by the Primary Care International
Study of Medical Errors (PCISME), and intended to describe errors
reported in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom and the United States. This taxonomy was re-eval-
uated by Jacobs et al. in 2007 [42], who concluded that it is not
suitable for Canadian data, and proposed a new classiﬁcation sys-
tem for errors in family medicine.
In 2003, The World Health Organization (WHO) set out to de-
velop the International Patient Safety Event Taxonomy, intended
to be adaptable and consistent across the continuum of health care
and around the world. This taxonomy is being empirically vali-
dated [43]. In 2005, the Joint Commission (JC, formerly known as
JCAHO) published a taxonomy for near misses and adverse events
based upon previous studies available in the literature [5]. The
whole taxonomy has over 200 subcategories and is endorsed by
the National Quality Forum as a standard for safety data sharing
and analysis across health care [44,45]. In 2010, the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) released common for-
mats for reporting patient safety data [46,47]. These formats con-
sist of requirements and speciﬁcations to facilitate the collection,
aggregation and analysis of incident reports. The main goal is that
such incidents be submitted to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs)
and shared through a network of patient safety databases (NPSD).
Although analysis methodologies and their outputs are yet to be
deﬁned, the agency expects that establishing a common language
and deﬁnitions for safety events will lead to better analysis of pa-
tient safety events.
In the United States, the JC patient safety event taxonomy is
considered an important guideline for safety analysts and
researchers; however, there is no ofﬁcial taxonomy. Institutions
classify and analyze incidents following general recommendations,
or state regulations, but still according to their own preferences.
Our research focuses on supporting risk analysts in their quest to
ﬁnd sources of risk. Information technology and data mining tech-
niques are used to systematically organize current knowledge
about system risk and analyze near-miss reports using the pre-
ferred taxonomy.3. Methodology to analyze near-miss reports
Wepropose theuseofunsupervisedclustering techniques toana-
lyzenear-missreportsandfacilitatesubsequentriskanalysis.Ourpro-
posed methodology is supported by a risk database that stores
previousknowledgeaboutrisks inthesystem.Themethodologycon-
sistsof:
i Systematic reporting of near-misses based on a taxonomy that
facilitates both reporting and initial processing of reports.
ii Identiﬁcation of clusters of near-miss reports to be considered
together in risk analysis.
Near-missEncounter
Activity type Focus of Near-miss Error cause
… … …
Fig. 2. Dimensions of the taxonomy.
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risk. Valid clusters will be preserved in the database for analysis
of future incidents, so new near-misses can be assigned to exist-
ing ‘‘valid’’ clusters or form new clusters.
The methodology is illustrated in Fig. 1. Shaded blocks repre-
sent steps in the analysis that require human input, such as risk
analysis and accepting or rejecting the validity of clusters found
by the system. The proposed methodology supports risk analysis
by organizing and allocating previous knowledge about system
risk. Basically, new near-misses reported will be assigned to both
a code deﬁned by the preferred taxonomy and a cluster deﬁned
by patterns within reports in a period of interest. Since it is impor-
tant to identify all potentially risky interactions in the system, it is
not required that resulting clusters of near-misses identiﬁed be
mutually exclusive. Near-misses assigned to previously existing
valid clusters can also be assigned to new clusters to ﬁnd new po-
tential risks.
We assume that there is no initial information about risk in the
system. However, if there are areas of interest represented by a
combination of codes in the taxonomy, i.e., a particular activity
such as patient discharge, clusters formed by near-misses related
to patient discharge activities can be initially determined as valid.
The proposed methodology is intended to ﬁnd (and rank) risk
sources. We characterize risk sources as combinations of categori-
cal values of the different attributes of the near-miss that co-occur
frequently.
In order to develop and implement this analysis methodology, a
coding scheme for near-misses is needed. We propose a taxonomy
structure based on subsets of the JC patient safety event taxonomy,
but simpler since it will be adapted to the speciﬁc setting where it
will be used. This structure is recommended for institutions that do
not currently have a coding scheme for reporting and plan to de-Structured 
near-miss 
reporting
Assign near-
misses to valid 
clusters
Risk analysis of 
new clusters
Accept / reject 
valid clusters
Create new 
clusters
Update risk 
database
Feedback
Accept / reject 
membership
Fig. 1. Methodology to analyze near-miss reports.velop their own. The overall analysis methodology can be imple-
mented using any taxonomy for reporting, as long as one is used
Fig. 2.
3.1. Proposed taxonomy for near-misses in outpatient settings
Since a taxonomy is required for a real-time near-miss report-
ing system, it should be as simple as possible while as comprehen-
sive as possible. We conducted brainstorming sessions with nurses,
AHP (Allied Health Practitioners), LIP (Licensed Independent Prac-
titioner), physicians and other medical staff, from 13 outpatient
clinics at the University of South Florida, including ambulatory sur-
gery, dermatology, family medicine, geriatrics, gynecology, inter-
nal medicine and gastroenterology, obstetrics, ophthalmology,
pediatrics, psychiatry, surgery, radiology and chemotherapy. Dur-
ing these sessions, we obtained a total of 667 near-misses. First,
we analyzed these near-misses to ﬁnd duplicates, and identiﬁed
386 unique event types. These unique near-misses were analyzed
by a multidisciplinary team, who identiﬁed 4 dimensions that
could be used to describe them. These dimensions were mainly de-
rived from the JC patient safety event taxonomy [5].
Each classiﬁed near-miss report is intended to provide standard
characteristics of the encounter and of the attributes perceived by
the reporter to have had the most signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the cor-
responding near-miss. If an event is identiﬁed as the result of a se-
quence or the combination of several signiﬁcant failures, we
recommend that multiple near-miss reports be submitted, so that
their attributes can be included in further analysis.
This speciﬁc taxonomy was developed for near-misses in outpa-
tient clinics; so, the lowest level categories are speciﬁc to outpa-
tient settings. Nevertheless, the overall structure is adaptable to
any setting.
Information about the characteristics of the encounter is in-
tended to be pulled directly from the electronic health record sys-
tem of the institution. Therefore, it is as comprehensive as the
information system of the institution allows. For the case of the
outpatient clinics, we propose to include: the clinic or location,
the service or procedure according to the codiﬁcation available,
the staff member involved, and demographic information about
the patient (age, gender, coexisting conditions, race/ethnicity and
socio-economic status). Actual categories and subcategories de-
pend on the setting and its information infrastructure.
Information about the characteristics of the near-miss is in-
tended to be reported by the staff member who experienced and/
or noticed the event. We propose that the near-miss is character-
ized by three main dimensions, each one corresponding to an attri-
bute of the event. These are: activity type, focus of near-miss and
error cause.
The activity type corresponds to the activity that was in process
when the event occurred. In our taxonomy for near-misses in out-
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tion management, patient management, medical test/procedure
and resource management. Each one of these categories has sub-
categories that can be further subdivided as needed (Fig. A.1).
The focus of the near-miss is the deﬁning characteristic of the
near-miss. It is related to the incident and the potential conse-
quences that were not actually experienced. The categories of this
attribute include: equipment/supplies, medication use, patient
speciﬁc, safety in the workplace, socio-economic based and test/
procedure related. Subcategories and detail are shown in Fig. A.2.
The error cause attempts to identify what type of breakdown
caused the error. In our taxonomy, categories include: human fac-
tor, organizational factor and technical mechanical factor. Subcat-
egories and detail are shown in Fig. A.3.
As previously mentioned, the proposed taxonomy structure is
applicable to any setting. In fact, the research team has started to
adapt this taxonomy to an inpatient setting. Some categories,
sub-categories and detail had to be added to each of the dimen-
sions and some terms had to be revised. Nevertheless, the structure
of the taxonomy remained as having three dimensions to describe
the near-miss.
3.1.1. Developing a taxonomy for near-misses in a particular setting
The proposed taxonomy structure has four dimensions in-
tended to be preserved regardless of the setting where it will be
utilized, while categories and subcategories should arise from the
speciﬁc characteristics of the setting. Brainstorming was used to
form the taxonomy and to assign initial values of severity to each
dimension of the taxonomy. The steps follow:
1. Initialize each dimension of the taxonomy with basic categories
from the JC Patient Safety Event Taxonomy that are deemed
applicable to the setting. This will form the initial near-miss
taxonomy.
2. Carry out a brainstorming session about near-misses with the
participation of several types of health care workers. The nom-
inal group process is used to elicit spontaneous reporting of
near-miss events experienced or witnessed by the individual
participants. The resulting list of near-misses will be called
‘‘potential near-misses’’.
3. Record the severity of the potential near-misses following an
agreed upon scale. We used a Failure Modes and Effects Analy-
sis (FMEA) scale.
4. Classify potential near-misses using the initial near-miss taxon-
omy (from step 1). Iterate until all potential near-misses are
assigned to a combination of categories and subcategories in
each dimension, as follows:
i Create a new category or subcategory for potential near-
misses classiﬁed as ‘‘other’’ in any dimension.
ii Re-evaluate potential near-misses to check if they corre-
spond to a newly created category.
iii Re-evaluate categories in each dimension to merge similar
categories.
5. For each code in the taxonomy, calculate the following severity
indicators based on the scores of the potential near-misses
assigned to the code:
Most likely severity: severity that repeats the most among the
corresponding near-misses [48].
Severity of worst case scenario: worst severity score of the corre-
sponding near-misses (corresponds to the minimum value in our
scoring system).
The severity indicators will be stored in a risk database (see
Fig. A.4) and used later when analyzing near-misses reported into
a system based on this taxonomy. They will also be updated as new
near-miss data arise and are analyzed.4. Clustering near-miss reports
Clustering is a data mining methodology that consists of group-
ing similar data into ‘‘clusters’’. In our application, a cluster is de-
ﬁned as a set of near-misses that are closely related to each
other, and less related to near-misses outside the cluster. Near-
miss clusters should also have a set of categorical values that will
characterize the source of risk related to the cluster. We are inter-
ested in ﬁnding at least one signiﬁcant cluster according to some
risk deﬁning criteria.
Our proposed methodology consists of clustering near-miss
data, characterizing the resulting clusters and ranking them
according to some risk deﬁning criteria. This methodology will
be explained in detail in Section 4.3. We will ﬁrst describe the data
and introduce concepts from data mining relevant to this
application.4.1. Near-miss data
The ﬁrst part of the research consisted of deﬁning an appropri-
ate structure for the reporting of near-misses that allows timely
analysis of data. The proposed taxonomy for near-misses deﬁnes
the shape of incident reports. Reports are characterized by all com-
ponents in the taxonomy; for each dimension we will include the
category, subcategory and detail. Therefore, we have more attri-
butes in the data set than the actual dimensions of the taxonomy.
This will facilitate further analysis of similarities between near-
miss reports.
As seen in Table 1, the near-miss reports dataset is formed by
objects characterized by 18 attributes. Most of these attributes
are categorical-nominal, but there are still numerical attributes
such as age of the patient or date and time of the event, which
make the dataset mixed. The reporting system is in principle vol-
untary; therefore, observations are not a random sample of events
that actually take place in the institution. Hence, inference from
frequency analysis and other descriptive statistical analyses may
provide biased results.
The second step in this research is to develop a methodology to
evaluate near-miss reports and extract groups of such reports that
may present hidden relations. In this process, there is not a prede-
termined classiﬁcation of causes. The objective in this step is to
provide the risk analyst with groups of reports characterized by
speciﬁc combinations of attribute values that should be analyzed
together to discover common causes. We use clustering for this
purpose.4.2. Clustering categorical and mixed data
Selecting the most appropriate clustering algorithm depends on
the speciﬁc characteristics of the data and the objective of the anal-
ysis. Our work focuses on clustering near-miss reports, which con-
sist of both qualitative and quantitative attributes. However, there
is no universally valid pre-determined taxonomy of sources of risk
to classify reports. Therefore, data must be clustered without infor-
mation about which categories are available to assign them to;
thus unsupervised clustering will be used. Unsupervised clustering
consists of ﬁnding natural clusters in the dataset without a pre-
determined number of clusters or speciﬁc cluster-deﬁning charac-
teristics. In unsupervised learning, the validity of models and con-
clusions drawn from the analysis are subjective, since there are no
expectations or reference for results [49]. Additionally, the mean-
ing of each cluster should be guided by the data and validated by
further subject matter expert analysis.
In this application, each near-miss report is a data point or
observation. There are a total of N observations in the database.
Table 1
Near-miss report structure.
Column number Column name Original attribute Description Attribute type Bounds/no of categories
0 EIN EIN Encounter identiﬁcation number Key
1 Date Date Number of days since January 00–00 Numerical [0, inf]
2 Time Time % of day Numerical [0, 1]
3 Set1 Setting Setting category Categorical 3
4 Set2 Setting detail Categorical 13
5 Serv Service Service category code Categorical 3
6 Comp Complexity Service complexity code Categorical 15
7 Age Age Patient age Numerical [0, 100]
8 Gend Gender Patient gender Categorical 2
9 Acat Activity Activity category Categorical 4
10 Asub Activity subcategory Categorical 19
11 Adet Activity detail Categorical 21
12 ECca Error Cause Error cause category Categorical 3
13 ECsu Error cause subcategory Categorical 12
14 ECde1 Error cause detail 1 Categorical 15
15 ECde2 Error cause detail 2 Categorical 20
16 FOca Focus Focus category Categorical 6
17 FOsu Focus subcategory Categorical 12
18 FOde Focus detail Categorical 23
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different attributes. Each attribute can be categorical or numerical
depending on its domain, Aj j = 1, . . . ,m. Then, each observation xi
is formed by the array (xa1, xa2, . . . , xam). Categorical attributes are
nominal, i.e., the order of the coding does not have an informative
meaning. For example, the ‘‘factor’’ of the near-miss is arbitrarily
coded as: 1: human, 2: technical or 3: organizational.
The mixed nature of the near-miss data set allows for the use of
methodologies to cluster both categorical and mixed data. If a cat-
egorical-only data-clustering algorithm is chosen, one can ‘‘discret-
ize’’ numerical attributes into categorical by creating meaningful
categories within the numerical values that the attribute can take.
In this paper, we propose to use the K-prototypes algorithm, pre-
sented by Huang [55], because it does not require transforming
numerical attributes into categorical; it is designed for datasets
with mixed attributes. The k-prototypes algorithm seeks to mini-
mize the cost of a cluster, which is the sum of distances of each ele-
ment of the cluster to its corresponding prototype. The distance
between elements is a combination of ‘‘mismatching’’ and Euclid-
ean distance for categorical and numerical attributes respectively.
Mismatching determines the number of attributes in which two
categorical observations differ.
Any unsupervised clustering algorithm applicable to the data
deﬁned by the preferred taxonomy is applicable to the proposed
methodology.4.3. Methodology to cluster near-misses
A near-miss cluster is deﬁned as a group of the near- miss re-
ports with more than 1 element (it can be generalized to more than
n0 elements). Near-miss clusters should also have an item-set with
a support higher than a speciﬁed threshold. The item-set will rep-Table 2
Cluster indicators to be used in ranking of near-miss groups.
Cluster Indicator Description
Cost, E(k) Clustering indicator that measures the quality of the cluster in te
% Novel reports Number of near-miss reports in the cluster whose code does not
Most likely
severity
Severity score that repeats the most within the cluster. It is initia
codes of the near-misses included in the cluster
Worst case
scenario
Worst severity found among the corresponding codes of near-mis
calculated automatically from information in the risk database
Density Number of near-miss reports in the cluster
Cost/density Cluster cost as determined by clustering methodology over numb
Item-sets
(support)
Joint values of different attributes that occur more frequently tharesent the risk-source related to the cluster. The objective is to ﬁnd
at least one low-cost cluster that has item-sets with maximum
support. The steps of the methodology are outlined below:
I. Deﬁne parameters
T: Threshold for item-sets. The threshold is deﬁned as the
minimum support that an item-set should have to be con-
sidered signiﬁcant.
e: Positive number that represents insigniﬁcant change in the
cost of the cluster ensemble.
II. Evaluate the whole data set as a cluster using cluster indica-
tors from Table 2.
III. Cluster the dataset. See the proposed clustering algorithm in
Section 4.3.2.
IV. For each resulting cluster, label it and record its elements
and cluster indicators (Table 2).
V. Characterize the resulting clusters using item-sets.
VI. Rank all resulting clusters (including the cluster formed by
the whole dataset) according to the preferred indicators.
It is assumed that cluster priority is based on identifying risk
source characteristics related to:
 Unknown or unexplored events, i.e., events with a lot of uncer-
tainty associated because there is not a clear idea of their prob-
ability or impact.
 Low probability, but high impact (severity) events.
 High probability, low impact events, i.e., events that occur
frequently.
Indicators are deﬁned to represent each one of these character-
istics. Table 2 presents each indicator and how to obtain it. We pro-rms of its scatter. It is an output of the clustering algorithm. See Section 4.3.2
have severity indicators assigned yet
lly calculated automatically from information in the risk database related to the
s reports. Corresponds to the minimum value in our scoring system. It is initially
er of near-misses in the cluster
n the speciﬁed support. Item-sets are found using the Apriori algorithm
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arrangement shown in Table 3 (Section 5) illustrates clusters
ranked by cost-density criteria.
The next section deﬁnes speciﬁc concepts related to the pro-
posed methodology to cluster near-misses to be used in step III
of the methodology, illustrates the clustering algorithm used and
illustrates the outcomes of the methodology.
4.3.1. General notation and deﬁnitions
Let S be the dataset formed by N near-miss reports. Each report
is characterized by m attributes, out of which, mn are numerical
and mc are categorical. Each categorical attribute, j = 1, . . . ,mc,
has a set of possible values Aj that come from the taxonomy.
Numerical attributes, j =mc + 1, . . . ,m should be standardized to
a number between 0 and 1. We will refer to the similarity of obser-
vations as d. Similarity between observations is deﬁned in this pa-
per as in [55].
4.3.2. Unsupervised bisecting K-prototypes algorithm
4.3.2.1. Data setup.
 Rearrange the columns of the dataset so categorical attributes
are together, preferably, but not necessarily, at the beginning.Table 3
Summary of clusters obtained from actual near-miss reports by using the proposed metho
Item-set
Activity Error cause
No n Cost/
n
Support Site Category Category Sub-
category
Detail
3 21 25.24 1 1 Human
factors
Staff Profes
staff
1 7 34.53 1 1 Human
Factors
4 3 38.26 1
2 1 67.42 1 Medical test/
procedure
Table 4
Modiﬁed Systems Hazards Analysis. Standardize numerical attributes to a [0, 1] scale where
min (Aj) = 0 and max (Aj) = 1, j =mc + 1, . . . ,m
 Set K = 1, i.e. the current number of clusters equal to 1. Assign
the whole data set to this cluster.
 Set t = 0 (iteration t = 0).
 Let the current cluster of interest k⁄ = 1 and evaluate the maxi-
mum similarity between elements within the cluster, dmax(1)
4.3.2.2. Iteration t.
Step 1. Record the furthest elements of cluster k⁄, f 1 and f

2 .
Assign these elements to the set of initial prototypes, P0 so that:
P10 ¼ f 1 and P20 ¼ f 1 .
Step 2. Partition cluster k⁄ into two sub-clusters by following
the k-prototypes algorithm described in Huang [55]. The output
of this step consists of: the new sub-clusters k1 and k

2, the set of
updated prototypes Pf, the maximum similarity within each
sub-cluster, dmaxk1 and dmaxk

2, the cost of each cluster, Ek1
and Ek2 and the total cost of the clustering scheme of iteration
t, (Et) as deﬁned in [55].
Step 3. Update the current clustering ensemble for the iteration:dology.
Focus
Detail Category Sub-category Gender Race Age
sional Physician Patient speciﬁc Medical record
problem
WHT
Test/procedure
related
Results
handling
F 49.5
744 L. Cure et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 44 (2011) 738–748If 2 sub-clusters were produced (this can be observed by check-
ing that the set of updated prototypes has two elements) then:
(1) Increase the number of clusters of the iteration: K ¼ K þ 1.
(2) Replace the cluster of interest with the ﬁrst sub-cluster:
K  k1.
(3) Put the second sub-cluster in the last position of the list of
clusters: K ¼ K; and K  k2.
(4) Record the number of clusters of the current iteration.
ncðtÞ ¼ k.
Otherwise, leave the cluster ensemble as it currently is and set
nc(t) = k.
Step 4. Verify stopping conditions:
If the total cost E(t) does not change signiﬁcantly, i.e.
ðEjðtÞ  Eðt  1Þj < e, then go to Step 6.
Otherwise, let t = t + 1.
Step 5. Choose the cluster with the highest dmax as the current
cluster of interest, k : k ¼ argmaxk¼1;...;K dmaxðkÞ.
Go to Step 1.ACTIVITY T
1. Information 
Management
2. Patient 
Management 
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processing 
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Interven
3
9. Other
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6. Scheduling
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Fig. A.1. Categories and subcatStep 6. Verify that all prototypes are different, and run a ﬁnal
iteration with the ﬁnal distinct prototypes.
Step 7. For each cluster, calculate its density, nk, cost, E(k), and
the ratio, Eknk.
The output of the algorithm is a table with the information ob-
tained in Step 7. Further analysis allows ranking of clusters by the
indicators from Table 2, to obtain a summary similar to the one
illustrated in Table 3.
The unsupervised version of the k-prototypes algorithm is
applicable to other algorithms that use a spatial reference to deﬁne
cluster centers such as k-means and k-medoids, when there is no
prior information that should help determine the initial centers.
The speed of the methodology depends on the speed of the cluster-
ing algorithm used; therefore, simpler clustering algorithms are
preferred. The convergence of the algorithm is guaranteed if addi-
tional stopping conditions are considered (for example, maximum
number of clusters allowed, minimum number of elements in each
cluster, desired cluster ensemble cost reduction).
As mentioned in Section 4.2, the validity of clusters from unsu-
pervised learning will depend on the analysis of clusters by ex-
perts, since there are no expectations or reference for the
corresponding results [49]. Since structured near-miss reports re-
ﬂect the perceptions of reporters, the resulting clusters are ex-
pected to reﬂect areas that healthcare workers consistently relateYPE
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Fig. A.2. Categories and subcategories for ‘‘focus of near-miss’’.
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organize these data and help analysts in further investigation ef-
forts. The proposed clustering methodology ensures that obviously
similar reports are grouped together, while allowing for groups of
‘‘non-obviously’’ similar reports to be formed as well. The next step
in the proposed methodology is to characterize each cluster in
terms of its components.
The proposed clustering algorithm can be replaced within the
overall methodology, described in Section 4.3, by other clustering
techniques deemed applicable to the dataset of interest.
4.3.3. Cluster characterization
Each cluster will be characterized by the signiﬁcant attribute
values in their elements, which are found in the corresponding
item-sets. For categorical attributes, attribute values present in
the cluster in a proportion higher than a speciﬁed threshold (sup-
port) will be used to characterize the cluster as the corresponding
source of risk. The Apriori algorithm [49] is proposed to ﬁnd item-
sets for categorical attributes. Additionally, we propose that signif-
icant numerical attributes be determined by their coefﬁcient of
variation, so numerical values with small coefﬁcient of variation
are included in the item-set.
5. Analysis of near-miss clusters
While the taxonomy for near-misses is intended to characterize
events (or potential events), the distinct combinations of attribute
values of coded reports is intended to guide the identiﬁcation of
sources of risk. Clustering coded near-misses provides the means
to ﬁnd subsets of near-misses likely to identify potential risk areas
in the system, when analyzed together.The near-miss reporting and analysis system is being imple-
mented at the University of South Florida (USF) Health Clinics. Ta-
ble 3 shows the output of our clustering methodology to a sample
of 33 near-misses reported by USF personnel.
The table shows a list clusters ranked by values for cost-density
ratio. Columns 5 to 15 show the corresponding attribute values of
the cluster item-set. We omitted all the date ﬁelds in this table.
Column 4 (Support) shows the ‘‘support’’ of the item-set, which
can be interpreted as the proportion of reports within the cluster
that have that particular combination of attribute values in their
individual code.
For example, the ﬁrst cluster in the rank, cluster no. 3, has the
majority of reports (n = 21). This cluster is characterized 100%
(Support = 1) by having taken place on site 1, being related to pa-
tient-speciﬁc issues within the medical records, and being attrib-
uted to physicians’ human factors. Events within this cluster can
be further studied to ﬁnd related potential sources of risk. In par-
ticular, when reviewing the comments of the reports within the
cluster, we found a consistent situation where critical documenta-
tion for surgical procedures, such as orders and consent, is missing
from the medical record. Similar documentation problems were
identiﬁed during the taxonomy brainstorming sessions as a com-
mon threat to patient safety in the outpatient environment. Anal-
ysis by the corresponding risk manager (or quality manager)
should be done to identify actual risks related to the documenta-
tion procedures and develop solutions to prevent potential adverse
events.
The second cluster in the rank, cluster number 1, is formed by
reports that seem different. Moreover, this cluster has only one
attribute in its item-set, which means that the only common char-
acteristic of these reports is that they are due to human factors.
746 L. Cure et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 44 (2011) 738–748This information may be insufﬁcient for further analysis of this
particular cluster as an indicator of a potential source of risk, and
may be dismissed as a valid cluster.
Using this cluster structure in conjunction with a formal risk
analysis technique will allow for the identiﬁcation and validation
of risk sources related to each cluster. Table 4 illustrates a modiﬁed
System Hazard Analysis (SHA) for near-misses in each cluster. The
structure of SHA facilitates the use of information technology to
automatically allocate previous information to newly reported
near-misses.
We modiﬁed the original System Hazard Analysis found in [59]
by adding a header of cluster characteristics, so that it can be used
as a form to input risk analysis data in the risk database. The head-
er includes the cluster identiﬁer, item-set, check-box to validate
(or reject) the cluster after risk analysis and a ﬁeld to register ac-
tual system risks (hazards) identiﬁed. Fields were added to charac-
terize each near-miss within the cluster. A column for near-miss
code was included. We suggest automating an initial assignment
of severity score, hazards/risks and recommended actions from
the database. The analyst will conﬁrm or overwrite such assign-
ments as a result of his/her analysis. For more information about
risk identiﬁcation and assessment techniques, refer to [59].ERROR CA
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The main goal of our methodology is to ﬁnd clusters of near-
misses that inform formal risk analysis. Accordingly, the taxonomy
was designed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Therefore,
the main attributes of a near-miss should be identiﬁed to make
the corresponding report using this taxonomy. We used brain-
storming to identify as many of the potential near-misses proper
of outpatient settings as possible.
To ensure face validity, the taxonomy was mostly derived from
the JC patient safety event taxonomy, which is endorsed by the
National Quality Forum [44]. Categories within the ‘‘Activity’’
dimension in our taxonomy were obtained from some of the cat-
egories of the ‘‘Type’’ dimension of the JC’s taxonomy. Similarly,
the main categories in our ‘‘Error Cause’’ dimension were derived
from categories found in the JC’s ‘‘Cause’’ dimension. Both of
these were expanded to cover more explicitly the situations that
may arise in the USF outpatient clinic. Finally, our ‘‘Focus’’ dimen-
sion is a logical extension of information required to characterize
near-misses.
Additionally, the application of our methodology to the preli-
minary set of near-misses resulted in tight clusters of obviously re-USE
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Fig. A.4. Simple risk database.
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of events that share some characteristics, but that would probably
have been missed by individual analysis (concept validity). In our
preliminary results, the most consistent risk was related to docu-
mentation in the medical record, which also came up during our
brainstorming sessions as a common threat to patient safety. Refer
to Section 4.3.3 for details of the preliminary analysis.
7. Conclusions and future Work
Near-miss reports, and the knowledge derived from their anal-
ysis, can be accumulated over time to enhance the analysis and
interpretation of reports. Availability of current risk-information
will strengthen risk identiﬁcation and effectively guide risk man-
agement efforts. This article presented a methodology to systemat-
ically handle near-miss reports and support their analysis.
We described the main components of the methodology, begin-
ning with a suggested taxonomy structure to report near-misses
and facilitate their processing. The taxonomy is based on the JC pa-
tient safety event taxonomy, but less complex because it focuses
on the system where it will be used. Then, we used an unsuper-
vised bisecting k-prototypes algorithm to cluster near-misses.
Unsupervised clustering yields groups of near-misses that should
be analyzed together for risk identiﬁcation. Finally, we suggest a
modiﬁed system hazard analysis, supported by a risk database, to
aid analysts in the identiﬁcation of system risks.
The overall methodology can be applied to all types of incidents
and is not restricted to near-misses. A different taxonomy for near-
misses or incidents can be used if preferred. Additionally, a differ-
ent clustering methodology can be used for clustering near-miss
reports. Finally, a preferred risk analysis methodology such as
FMEA, or other, can be implemented.
As mentioned in Section 5, the near-miss reporting system has
been partially implemented at the University of South Florida Clin-
ics. So far, the taxonomy has been developed (see Appendix A) and
staff has been trained in its use. The reporting system is available
in all the computers within the facilities. The clustering methodol-
ogy has been manually applied to the reports available. Clusters
have been prioritized using the cost-density criteria, and risks re-
lated to documentation protocols have identiﬁed.
The next stages of development and implementation include
automation, evaluation and enhancement. The methodology will
be automated into a risk database to accumulate information about
risk over time, and severity and novelty criteria will be included.
The overall methodology will be revisited to address speciﬁc situ-
ations that arise from day-to-day use. Speciﬁcally, the cluster (risk)
validation and learning portion of the methodology will be evalu-
ated and enhanced to appropriately manage information about in-
valid and valid clusters, and the corresponding sources of risk that
are identiﬁed over time.
Appendix A. Taxonomy for near-misses in outpatient settings
Figs. A.1–A.3.Appendix B. Risk database
A simple risk database should be kept, so new near-misses can
be related to prior occurrences or current risk information. This
database can also be used to manage risk and their corresponding
recommended actions. See Fig. A.4.
For the purpose of the Hazard analysis, the near-miss table is ﬁl-
tered by cluster according to the ranking, and near-misses are
sorted according to their codes considering item-sets ﬁrst.References
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